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Abstract
This paper analyzes the reasons underlying low labor force partici-
pation rates (LFPRs) of women and the elderly population in Italy
and Germany. The international comparison highlights the eﬀects of
diﬀerent institutional arrangements on labor market outcomes. The
study is based on panel microdata, allowing to trace the dynamics of
the retirement process at the individual level.
The empirical evidence shows that in both Italy and Germany work-
ers tend to retire before reaching the normal retirement age and that
female LFPRs are lower in Italy than in Germany, due mainly to lower
education level. The data also show that, given the same social and
economic characteristics of individuals, the male/female wage diﬀeren-
tials are higher in Germany. So lower female LFPRs in Italy apparently
do not depend on wage discrimination.
Although the education level of the elderly is relatively low in Italy,
this is not suﬃcient to explain the trend towards early retirement that
characterizes Italian labor force. The Italian early retirement scheme
(pensioni di anzianita`) seems to provide a stronger incentive to retire
than the German pathways to early retirement.
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1 Introduction
The economic and ﬁnancial imbalance of German and Italian pension sys-
tems due to institutional and demographic factors has motivated recent
reform attempts.
In a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) system, where workers directly ﬁnance
pension outlays, the policy maker has in principle four reform instruments:
(1) letting wages increase faster than pensions, (2) cutting beneﬁts, (3)
increasing labor force participation rate (LFPR), (4) reducing the number
of entitlements.
This is easily seen by considering the statistical equilibrium contribution
rate α = PNp/WNw, where P is the average pension, Np is the number of
pensioners, W average gross earnings and Nw the number of workers. Given
that pensions are indexed (to net wages in Germany and to consumer price
index in Italy) and that reducing beneﬁts faces strong social and political
opposition, α can be modiﬁed mainly through Np and Nw.
The ratio Np/Nw depends on demographic and socio-economic factors.
Italian and German policy makers can hardly inﬂuence the demographic
development and its projections are indeed dramatic: the dependency ratio,
the ratio between population over 60 and population aged 15-59 as estimated
by EUROSTAT (Demographic Statistics), will rise from today’s 40% to 70%
in year 2030. Afterwards, it will stabilize in Germany while continuing to
rise in Italy (up to 85% in 2040). The total population, net of migration
ﬂows, will start falling after year 2010. This is mainly due to a sharp drop
in total fertility rates well below the equilibrium ratio of 2.1 ever since the
70’s. Today the two countries, together with Japan, record the world’s
lowest fertility rate, equal to 1.2.
Not only demographic factors are going to raise the contribution equi-
librium rate: workers tend to retire earlier and female LFPRs is rising only
slowly (EUROSTAT, Community Labor Force Survey [11] [12]). Male LF-
PRs in Italy between ages 60 and 64 has dropped from 70% in 1983 to 50%
in 1998. For the same period and age group male LFPRs in Germany have
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fallen from 78% to 64%. In Germany 60-64 is the ﬁrst age group for which
LFPRs show a substantial decline, whereas they start falling soon after age
50 in Italy. Characteristic of the Italian labor force is also the reduction of
employment rates of young workers: they passed from 86% to under 70%
between 1983 and 1998 for the age group 25-29. This is partly due to higher
speciﬁc unemployment rates than in Germany.
The two countries also diﬀer for what concerns female LFPRs. Female
employment rates over age 50 in Italy are roughly half those of Germany.
Rates for age group 60-64 remained stable around 20% in Italy and 40% in
Germany between 1983 and 1998.
Looking at the elderly, it is assumable that at a certain age there is an
incentive to retire from work and to get a pension. If individuals respond to
this incentive, it is crucial for a policy maker to know something about its
determination. While structural models, like Stock and Wise [22], Phelan
and Rust [16], Rust [19], try to quantify these incentives, this study uses
information to highlight how the two countries diﬀer in providing them.
Despite the relevance of this topic, there are few microeconomic studies
concentrate on incentives to retire and retirement behavior in the two coun-
tries. Main exceptions are in Germany studies by Bo¨rsch-Supan [5], who
made an international comparison between the German and the American
social security system [2], Riphan [17], Schmidt [18] and Siddiqui [20], and
in Italy studies by Peracchi [15], Brugiavini [7] [8], Spataro [21]. Also An-
tolin, Scarpetta [1] and Miniaci [14] of the OECD’s Economics Department
analyze, for Germany and Italy respectively, the retirement decision of the
elderly.
Normative regulations seem to be relevant to analyze and to compare
LFPRs and retirement behavior in Italy and Germany. For this reason it
is useful to stress ﬁrst the institutional diﬀerences between the two pension
systems.
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2 Institutional details
Both Germany (1992) and Italy (1992, 1995) have recently undertaken pen-
sion reform processes, but they both require transitional periods to be fully
implemented. For this reason the samples considered in this study are only
marginally aﬀected by the reforms. Only the main set of rules that directly
inﬂuence the observed samples are therefore reported, with particular at-
tention devoted to early and old-age retirement. Subsection 2.4 will brieﬂy
describe the recent reforms.
2.1 Organization
Public pension systems in both Italy and Germany are managed by a number
of administrative bodies, of which the main ones are the Istituto Nazionale
della Previdenza Sociale (INPS) in Italy and the Landesversicherungsanstal-
ten in Germany. Insurance is mandatory and ﬁnanced on a PAYG basis.
Complementary and supplementary pensions have so far gained little rel-
evance largely because of the high replacement rates oﬀered by the public
schemes.
2.2 Eligibility criteria
In Italy, eligibility for old-age pensions (pensione di vecchiaia) requires 15
years of contribution and 60 or 55 years of age for men and women re-
spectively. Private workers are entitled to early retirement (pensione di
anzianita`) after 35 years of contributions without age limits. In the public
sector instead, the years of contributions for early retirement could be less
than 20.
Germany also has diﬀerent exit pathways from work. Workers meet the
eligibility criteria for old-age pensions when they reach age 65 after a mini-
mum of 5 years of contribution (Regelaltersrente). Early retirement can be
claimed after 35 years of contributions at a minimum age of 63 (Altersrente
fu¨r langja¨hrig Versicherte) or 60 in case of disability (Altersrente fu¨r Schwer-
behinderte, Berufs- oder Erwebsunfa¨hige). There are three cases in which
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one can claim old age disability beneﬁts: (1) being physically disabled to
at least 50%; (2) passing a strict earnings test; (3) passing a weak earnings
test. Of the two earnings tests, the latter refers to disability in a speciﬁc
job, the former to disability in any reasonable occupation.
Workers unemployed for 12 of the last 18 months and aged 60 or more
are entitled to early retirement if they contributed for 8 of the last 10 years
and 15 years overall (Altersrente wegen Arbeitslosigkeit). Another important
way to exit the labor force is the so called 57-Regel: workers dismissed when
57 take up unemployment beneﬁts for 3 years, until they meet the old-age
unemployment pension age criteria. Finally, women born before 1952 can
retire at age 60 if they have contributed for 15 years (of which 10 in the last
40).
2.3 Beneﬁt computation
In Italy a rate of return of 2% on each year of contribution (up to a maximum
of 40) is computed on the average actualized gross income over the last
working years (5 years in 1993).
In Germany the computation is more complex: monthly beneﬁts are
the product of the employee’s relative amount of contributions (converted
in “income points”), a factor depending on type of pension, retirement age
and the average pension.
Both system are progressive, because of capping on earnings minimum
beneﬁts. Labor income and pension beneﬁts are, at least partially, not
mutually exclusive. Finally, in Italy beneﬁts are subject to income taxation,
whereas in Germany contributions are taxed and pensions are tax free.
2.4 Recent reforms
The German reform has the explicit aim of eliminating the incentives to
retire before age 65 and stabilizing real pension beneﬁts to about 70% of net
earnings.
This has been implemented by (1) actualizing the beneﬁts for life ex-
pectancy at retirement, (2) introducing partial retirement (Teilrente), (3)
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changing indexing of beneﬁts from gross to net wages and, (4) raising and
linking public ﬁnancing of the system to demographic and economic devel-
opments, so redistributing their eﬀects between pensioners and workers.
The same objectives have been pursued in Italy by the 1992 “Amato”
and the 1995 “Dini” reforms. The 1992 reform, although maintaining the
general organization of the system, heightened age and contributive eligibil-
ity criteria and lengthened the reference working period for the computation
of beneﬁts. It has gradually raised the normal retirement age up to 65 for
men and 60 for women by year 2005. The 1995 reform has introduced ﬂexible
actuarially adjusted retirement between age 57 and 65. This more marked
insurance characteristic of the system can be found also in the reduction
from 20 to 5 years of the minimum contributive period for eligibility to
beneﬁts.
The 1995 reform has also switched from a retributive to a contributive
pension formula tying beneﬁts to the whole contributive history of workers.
In this new formula the rate of return on contributions paid (currently 33%
of payroll) is equal to a 5-years moving average of GDP growth rates. The
ﬁnal amount is then actualized by life expectancy at retirement.
3 Data description
The data presented in the introduction is taken from EUROSTAT. In par-
ticular we refer to the yearly Demographic Statistics and to the Community
Labor Force Survey [11] [12].
The longitudinal microdata come from two diﬀerent surveys carried out
by the Bank of Italy and the Deutsches Institut fu¨r Wirtschaftsforschung.
The Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) is a biennial
cross-section with, since 1989, a panel component [3], whereas the German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), started in 1984, is annual and fully longi-
tudinal [10]. Only the GSOEP’s sample “A”, referring to population residing
in West Germany, has been used in this paper. The purpose of the GSOEP
is to collect yearly representative microdata on individuals and households
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Table 1: Comparison between the current and the prevalent working status in the
Italian panel (in %)
“current”
“prevalent” 1991 1995
employed unemployed employed unemployed
employed 98.79 1.21 98.36 1.64
unemployed 3.95 96.05 9.09 90.91
in order to measure stability and change in working and living conditions,
while the SHIW focuses on income and wealth of households. Nevertheless,
they both collect demographic, labor market, social security, housing, health
and education information. The latest surveys available at the time of this
study were the 1995 SHIW and 1996 GSOEP survey.
It was necessary to modify some variable deﬁnition in order to be able to
compare the two surveys. Regarding education levels, the 1997 United Na-
tions, International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED) has been
adopted. The conversion rules are the same used by the Istituto Nazionale
di Statistica (ISTAT) and by the Bundesministerium fu¨r Statistik: ISCED0
indicates illiteracy, ISCED1 stands for primary education, ISCED2 refers
to ﬁrst level secondary education (scuola media/Realschule, Hauptschule),
which represents the lowest education level observed in the German sample.
ISCED3 indicates an high school diploma (Diploma di maturita`/Abitur),
ISCED5 a university degree.
Another issue is related to diﬀerent deﬁnitions of unemployment. In the
SHIW the question is on the prevalent working status during the previous
year, whereas in Germany the discrimination is based on the registration at
the public labor oﬃce as unemployed. For 1991 and 1995 the Italian panel
reports the current employment status. A comparison between the current
and the prevalent status shows that the two variables are similar (table 1) as
far as employment is considered. Unemployment data is more problematic:
in 1995 9% of those reporting themselves “currently” unemployed are at the
same time “in prevalence” employed during the year.
Important information, such as health status or municipality size is not
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contemporaneously available in both surveys. In addition, due to privacy
protection, information on household wealth is not accessible to foreign re-
searchers in the German panel.
It was also necessary to adjust the data on earnings and pension beneﬁts
to make them comparable. While the GSOEP provides information on aver-
age monthly gross wages and current monthly net wage, the SHIW provides
information on annual net wages. Multiplying German monthly earnings by
the number of months worked we derived annual aggregates. We also choose
to use net amounts instead of estimating gross values for Italy. Finally we
added diﬀerent kinds of fringe beneﬁts to German earnings (i.e. Christmas
bonus of a month’s pay) already included in the Italian annual earnings.
SHIW has more detailed information on pensions while GSOEP aggre-
gates data on invalidity and survivor beneﬁts. This is why we limited our-
selves to the analysis of work-related pensions.
Regarding sample selection, we concentrate on individuals for whom a
minimum of two completed interviews are available. Self-employed workers
have not been included in this sample, due to the underestimation of the
their declared earnings [3] [6].
4 Non parametric analysis
The objective of this section is to highlight the more frequently used path-
ways out of the labor market. Since the surveys do not distinguish between
old-age and early retirement pensions, the importance of the diﬀerent retire-
ment options is evaluated looking at the spikes in the frequency distribution
of actual retirement ages (ﬁgure 1). Recalling the eligibility criteria, they
reﬂect the key features of the two systems.
The curve relative to German men has three spikes: at age 60 (17%),
at age 63 (16%), and at age 65 (9%), corresponding respectively to the
age criteria for invalidity and unemployment old-age pension, long-service
old-age pension and normal old-age pension. The Italian distribution also
presents three spikes: at age 55 (8%), 60 (15%) the normal retirement age
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Figure 1: Above: age distribution of retirement. Below: cumulative distribution by
age. Italy(-), Germany(o)
in the private sector and 65 (9%) the normal retirement age in the public
sector.
Since in Italy there is no age limit to claim for seniority pensions, the
curve is ﬂatter and the cumulative distribution is always above the German
one. At age 57, about 50% of Italian and 22% of German male workers have
retired.
For women, the distance between the cumulative curves of the two coun-
tries is even more striking. This is due to the Italian sharpest spike at age
55 (23%), the normal retirement age in the private sector. The other two
spikes are at age 60 (14%) and at age 65 (5%), the normal retirement age in
the public sector. In Germany women mostly retire at age 60 (24%) and at
age 65 (25%), the statutory limits for women and normal old-age pension
respectively. As a result, while in Germany at age 55 there are nearly no
retired working women, in Italy the percentage is about 50%. At 60 about
40% and 83% of women is retired in Germany and Italy respectively. The
two curves converge only after age 65.
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Figure 2: Hazard rates in Italy(-) and Germany(o)
The probability of retiring during the year for an individual aged T ,
working until age t and retiring between age t and t + 1 is given by:
λ(t) = Pr(t ≤ T < t + 1 |T ≥ t). (1)
Dividing the number of retired workers pit, at age t, in year i by the popu-
lation at risk rit, the number of workers who have not yet retired, gives an
estimate of the hazard rates out of the labor force related to the period,
λˆ(t) =
S∑
i=s
ωi
pit
rit
(2)
where wi is the year-speciﬁc weight. Figure 2 plots the results which are
comparable to those reported in Brugiavini [7].
The results show that until age 60 the Italian curves are always above the
German ones with the spikes reﬂecting once again institutional characteris-
tics. For example, in Italy a male worker aged 60 has a probability around
50% of retiring within the following year. In Germany the same probability
is about 30%.
Italian workers tend to retire earlier than German ones. How much re-
placement rates, measuring the loss of purchasing power due to the transition
from work to retirement, are responsible for this diﬀerent behavior?
Replacement rates are deﬁned as the ratio at the individual level between
the ﬁrst work-related monthly net pension beneﬁt pt,i and the last monthly
total net wage yt−z,i. The lag between two surveys z is equal to one in Ger-
many and 2 in Italy. There is no calendar information in the Italian survey
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and it is impossible to reconstruct the monthly working condition. That is
why in the case of retirement the average pension beneﬁt has been divided
by the average monthly wage of the previous survey to obtain replacement
rates. To avoid biased replacement rates of workers who retire gradually,
workers whose average working time in the last working year is under the 30
hours per week have not been taken into account. The average replacement
rate of this subsample indexed i for survey t is therefore
τ =
1
nT
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
pt,i
πt,zyt−z,i
, (3)
where πt,z is the price index factor between t− z and t.
This rates are reported in table 2. They are high in both countries,
especially if compared with the ones recorded in the US and the UK [23].
This is because the two public systems are designed to extend the standard
of living that was achieved during the working life into retirement. In both
cases replacement rates range between 70 and 80%, close to the statutory
maximum in Italy. The results obtained do not show trends able to account
for diﬀerences in retirement behavior between Italy and Germany. It is also
interesting to notice that, within each country, public sector and white collar
workers show the highest rates. No cohort-speciﬁc trend could be detected
in the analysis.
Cross-sectional survey studies, such as Bo¨rsch-Supan [2] and VDR (Ver-
band Deutscher Versicherungstra¨ger) [24] calculate replacement rates di-
viding the average net pension E(pt | pt > 0) by the average net wages
E(yt | yt > 0). This formula is based on a diﬀerent subsample and is in
general diﬀerent from τ .
5 Parametric Analysis
This section presents the econometric analysis trying to explain lower LF-
PRs of elderly workers and women in Italy. Tables reporting coeﬃcients,
standard errors, signiﬁcance levels and r-squared of all of the models are
shown in the appendix.
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Table 2: Average (μ) and standard deviation (σ) of net replacement rates; n number
of observations.
Italy Germany
age group μ σ n μ σ n
18-22 0.626 0.588 3 0.334 0.000 1
23-27 0.796 0.463 27 0.873 0.576 15
28-32 0.652 0.322 83 0.866 0.305 124
33-37 0.796 0.280 134 0.847 0.311 128
38-42 0.769 0.246 109 0.865 0.391 38
43-47 0.795 0.203 44 0.777 0.145 12
men 0.767 0.305 315 0.849 0.275 230
women 0.724 0.257 85 0.864 0.446 88
private sector 0.713 0.297 298 0.827 0.346 206
public sector 0.887 0.250 102 0.902 0.296 112
blue collar 0.769 0.235 154 0.829 0.261 121
white collar 0.870 0.267 162 0.893 0.280 151
self-employed 0.522 0.314 81 0.627 0.520 28
total 0.758 0.295 400 0.853 0.331 318
5.1 Employment rates
The ﬁrst model estimates the probability
π(x) = Pr(Y > 0|X = x) (4)
of receiving labor income, using the linear logit speciﬁcation:
π(x) =
eα+β
′x
1 + eα+β′x
. (5)
Probabilities of receiving earnings from work substantially coincide (ta-
ble 3) with employment rates (see also [15]) and they are therefore treated
as equal. The individual that we take as baseline in the model (indicated by
the constant term α) is aged 50, with ISCED2 education level, is married
with a child, his household is of three components and lives in tenancy. The
baseline probability of receiving labor income is given by:
π(0) =
eα
1 + eα
(6)
Table 4 shows the eﬀects of education on employment rates. The estimated
probabilities are particularly low in Italy, especially among young women
and the elderly. In Germany, at age 60, the reference individual receives
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Table 3: Percentage of recipients of labor income (Y), labor-related pensions (P)
and residual category (Ø) compared to labor force (LF) status in 1989-95
Italy Germany
Y P Ø Y&P Y P Ø Y&P
males
out of LF 0.51 86.13 11.12 2.23 4.94 81.93 5.06 8.07
employed 88.05 1.59 7.47 2.89 95.71 0.11 1.05 3.14
unemployed 17.78 0.00 82.22 0.00 55.61 2.93 39.02 2.44
total 47.32 39.65 10.49 2.54 59.54 31.24 4.24 4.97
females
out of LF 0.29 31.65 67.75 0.31 4.35 46.93 46.69 2.03
employed 84.71 2.19 11.15 1.94 96.01 0.06 2.14 1.79
unemployed 17.39 0.00 82.61 0.00 43.14 0.65 55.56 0.65
total 17.04 25.66 56.67 0.63 35.21 30.39 32.49 1.91
labor income with a probability of 58% against the 41% of Italy. For a
woman of the same age and characteristics the probabilities are 11% and
6% respectively.
In the case of Germany, the number of ISCED0 and ISCED1 observations
do not allow estimating the probabilities. Concerning Italy, low education
levels have a considerable eﬀect on employment, especially in the ﬁrst years
of working life.
Excluding Italian women, ISCED3 and ISCED5 slightly reduce LFPRs
until 35-40 years. Afterwards, their impact is strongly positive and increas-
ing with age: for an Italian male worker aged 60 with ISCED3 the LFPR is
62% (+49% than the baseline). Among women the eﬀects of education are
already tangible at younger ages: at 25 the LFPR is 40% (+42%), at 60 it
is 22% (+256%!). ISCED5 widens these trends: a graduated woman at 60
has a probability of working 10 times higher than her ISCED2 counterpart.
In Germany, the eﬀects of education are less marked. Men, in particular,
do not show appreciable diﬀerences between ISCED3 and ISCED5. At 60, a
worker with education higher than ISCED2 is employed with a probability
of 74% (+20%). Again, the evidence show deeper diﬀerences among women:
at age 60, the ISCED3 LFPR is 15% (+30%) while the ISCED5 rate is 32%
(+185%).
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Table 4: Probability estimates of receiving labor income. var.% is the percentage
diﬀerential of probability with respect to the reference individual.
age base ISCED0 var.% ISCED3 var.% ISCED5 var.%
Italy - men
25 0.909 0.784 -0.137 0.821 -0.097 0.724 -0.204
30 0.954 0.894 -0.062 0.922 -0.033 0.900 -0.056
35 0.967 0.932 -0.036 0.955 -0.012 0.956 -0.011
40 0.967 0.939 -0.029 0.963 -0.003 0.973 0.007
45 0.952 0.923 -0.030 0.958 0.006 0.977 0.026
50 0.903 0.866 -0.042 0.931 0.031 0.971 0.074
55 0.756 0.708 -0.064 0.849 0.124 0.949 0.256
60 0.414 0.386 -0.068 0.617 0.492 0.877 1.118
Italy - women
25 0.271 0.111 -0.591 0.387 0.424 0.375 0.382
30 0.402 0.205 -0.489 0.565 0.405 0.618 0.536
35 0.478 0.288 -0.398 0.669 0.398 0.767 0.603
40 0.486 0.324 -0.334 0.704 0.448 0.835 0.718
45 0.424 0.300 -0.294 0.679 0.601 0.854 1.015
50 0.302 0.224 -0.259 0.586 0.941 0.837 1.772
55 0.161 0.128 -0.205 0.418 1.592 0.773 3.793
60 0.061 0.054 -0.115 0.216 2.560 0.631 9.396
Germany - men
25 0.884 . . 0.761 -0.138 0.813 -0.080
30 0.916 . . 0.852 -0.070 0.882 -0.036
35 0.927 . . 0.895 -0.035 0.914 -0.015
40 0.924 . . 0.911 -0.014 0.924 0.000
45 0.905 . . 0.910 0.005 0.920 0.017
50 0.859 . . 0.891 0.037 0.899 0.046
55 0.761 . . 0.843 0.107 0.849 0.115
60 0.577 . . 0.743 0.287 0.743 0.287
Germany - women
25 0.510 . . 0.484 -0.051 0.464 -0.091
30 0.574 . . 0.563 -0.020 0.581 0.012
35 0.591 . . 0.594 0.005 0.648 0.097
40 0.563 . . 0.580 0.030 0.670 0.191
45 0.488 . . 0.520 0.065 0.651 0.334
50 0.370 . . 0.414 0.120 0.587 0.588
55 0.230 . . 0.276 0.199 0.473 1.054
60 0.113 . . 0.146 0.300 0.321 1.846
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Figure 3: LFPRs estimates by education levels over the whole sample. The numbers
used as labels indicates the ISCED level.
Figure 3 presents average values of LFPRs by education and age es-
timated for the whole sample. It clearly shows a higher volatility of em-
ployment rates in Italy, especially among women, where the diﬀerentials of
employment rates at diﬀerent education levels are striking.
To sum up, education seems to have a strong eﬀect on employment,
especially among women and especially in Italy. It is worth noting that
Italian women at ISCED3 and ISCED5 show employment rates higher than
the correspondent German ones.
Diﬀerences in LFPRs are therefore the result of a diﬀerent distribution
of education, reported for the 1995 sample in table 5. The distribution is
substantially stable across age groups for males in Germany. Italian males
and females in both countries show a large drop of education levels after
age group 45-49. In 1995, Italian workers over age 50 show a large educa-
tional gap relative to German ones, due mainly to the high percentage of
individuals at ISCED1. Moreover, roughly half of the women over 50 is at
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most at ISCED1 with estimated employment rates around 10%. In Ger-
many, between 70 and 75% of women is at ISCED2, the lowest recorded in
that survey, with employment rates near 20%. These diﬀerentials in educa-
tion are relevant to workers reaching retirement age (the eﬀects of education
on the retirement decision will be analyzed later on) whereas for younger
generations the educational gap closes. In Italy the percentage of ISCED3
women is steadily increasing. In 1995, 15% of women in age group 55-59
held a ISCED3 degree, the percentage was 55% for age group 25-29, even
higher than in Germany, where it stood at 30%.
Nevertheless, it is worth bearing in mind that in Germany, after for-
mal education, one or two years are commonly spent in on-the-job training
(Lehre). Since the Italian survey do not report data of this kind, apprentice-
ship is not included in the models estimated. This fraction of accumulated
human capital has presumably a positive inﬂuence on the probability of be-
ing employed, especially at young ages. Between years 25 and 29, in fact, at
ISCED3 and ISCED5 Italy shows employment rates lower than the German
ones.
Since education of women is increasing with succeeding cohorts, their
LFPRs in Italy will increase in the future. To make the process faster,
investments in apprenticeship programs should be undertaken. For Italian
women, a higher ﬂexibility of working hours would be needed (ﬁgure 4), in
order to reconcile professional and familiar duties.
5.2 Earnings estimates
Diﬀerences in LFPRs seem to depend on formal education, on-the-job train-
ing and labor market ﬂexibility. It remains to be investigated if the positive
correlation between education and employment rates acts through earnings.
In fact, it is reasonable to hypothesize that an individual can refuse a wage
oﬀer if it is below his personal reservation wage (deﬁned as the subjective
evaluation of one own work). Assuming that personal reservation wages are
less elastic than oﬀered wages, especially when the latter are falling, low edu-
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Table 5: Education levels distribution by age group in 1995 - (percentages)
age ISCED0 ISCED1 ISCED2 ISCED3 ISCED5
Italy - men
25-29 0.23 3.04 29.91 52.34 14.49
30-34 0.31 4.91 39.26 39.57 15.95
35-39 2.62 6.71 41.11 41.11 8.45
40-44 0.83 15.19 35.36 35.08 13.54
45-49 1.52 21.27 31.65 35.19 10.38
50-54 0.81 31.35 32.97 26.22 8.65
55-59 2.85 42.74 23.93 22.51 7.98
total 1.28 17.75 33.24 36.35 11.38
Germany -men
25-29 4.31 . 43.13 36.12 16.44
30-34 2.39 . 40.58 37.40 19.63
35-39 1.71 . 41.98 33.79 22.53
40-44 0.38 . 48.46 30.77 20.38
45-49 0.00 . 49.79 31.38 18.83
50-54 0.00 . 48.69 30.37 20.94
55-59 0.00 . 56.09 25.83 18.08
total 1.55 . 46.25 32.82 19.38
Italy - women
25-29 0.86 4.00 24.57 55.43 15.14
30-34 0.77 7.14 34.95 44.13 13.01
5-39 0.51 13.01 32.91 43.11 10.46
40-44 1.73 22.96 33.58 31.60 10.12
45-49 3.29 36.00 26.82 21.65 12.24
50-54 3.44 46.83 27.78 17.72 4.23
55-59 10.47 52.34 17.91 14.88 4.41
total 2.96 26.10 28.54 32.42 9.98
Germany - women
25-29 5.28 . 56.30 28.74 9.68
30-34 3.71 . 52.00 35.14 9.14
35-39 0.92 . 55.38 30.77 12.92
40-44 1.16 . 60.08 25.97 12.79
45-49 0.84 . 66.11 22.18 10.88
50-54 0.00 . 71.63 21.86 6.51
55-59 0.40 . 76.89 19.52 3.19
total 2.02 . 61.34 27.13 9.50
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Figure 4: Average weekly working hours for men and women in Italy and Germany
cation levels will be associated with low observed wages and low employment
levels. Nonetheless, diﬀerences between LFPRs of men and women may well
be related to discrimination in pay, measured by remuneration diﬀerentials.
Therefore, a log-linear function for net earnings has been estimated with
prices at 1998 values (table 12). Being the dependent variable the log of
earnings y, lnα∗ = α and ln ∗i = i, we obtain that:
yi = α + x′iβ + i
eyi = eα+x
′
iβ+i
Yi = α∗ex
′
iβ∗i . (7)
Coeﬃcients of continuous variables measure rates of growth of earn-
ings while coeﬃcients of dummy variables measure diﬀerentials in rates of
growth with respect to the baseline (aged 50, ISCED2, married, working the
whole year, working 40 hours per week, his partner not employed, living in
tenancy). Age enters in quadratic form and in linear combination with ed-
ucation levels. The hypothesis, suggested by the economic theory of human
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capital [4], is that education-related diﬀerentials increase with age.
In fact, the functional form of (7) can be interpreted under this theory.
If Y0 are earnings obtained without education and Y1 remuneration after a
year of formal schooling, the rate of return of a year of education is:
r1 =
Y1 − Y0
Y0
. (8)
Computing rates of return for years 1, 2, ..., s and assuming r1 = r2 =
... = rs = r suﬃciently small, (1 + r) can be approximated by er,
Y2 = Y1(1 + r2) = Y0(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
...
Ys = Y0(1 + r1)(1 + r2)...(1 + rs)
Ys = Y0ers . (9)
Table 6 shows education-related earnings diﬀerentials.
With respect to the baseline, ISCED0, now joining ISCED0 and ISCED1,
does not greatly reduce earnings in Italy. In Germany, bearing in mind
the low number of observations, the eﬀects are still negative but stronger.
ISCED3 raises income for men, both Italian and German, by 5-10% at age
25 and by 30-33% at age 65. These trends are steeper for women, especially
if Italian: 124% at age 25 and 148% at age 65.
The widest wage diﬀerentials are recorded at ISCED5. They are roughly
125% (150% for Italian women) at age 25 reaching in Italy for both sexes
190% at age 65. In Germany, diﬀerentials reach 232% for men and 280% for
women.
Wage diﬀerentials between sexes with ﬁxed socio-demographic charac-
teristics are deﬁned as the ratio between female and male wages. Table 7
shows that they are close to 60-65% in Germany and 75-80% in Italy. Ex-
cluding ISCED0 for the reasons already highlighted, diﬀerentials narrow at
higher education levels. At ISCED3, for instance, they are 9 percentage
points lower in Italy and 2 percentage points lower in Germany.
Diﬀerences between the two countries are striking, signaling a stronger
protection of female work in Italy which is probably also a source of lower
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Table 6: Education-related income diﬀerentials with respect to the reference cate-
gory (ISCED2). ISCED0: illiteracy or low education level; ISCED3: high-school
degree; ISCED5: university degree;
age ISCED0 ISCED3 ISCED5 ISCED0 ISCED3 ISCED5
Italy - men Italy - women
25 0.972 1.102 1.251 1.019 1.239 1.519
30 0.947 1.128 1.320 0.978 1.266 1.562
35 0.923 1.155 1.393 0.940 1.294 1.606
40 0.900 1.183 1.469 0.903 1.323 1.651
45 0.878 1.211 1.550 0.867 1.353 1.698
50 0.856 1.241 1.635 0.833 1.383 1.746
55 0.834 1.270 1.725 0.800 1.414 1.795
60 0.813 1.301 1.819 0.768 1.445 1.846
65 0.793 1.332 1.919 0.738 1.477 1.898
Germany - men Germany - women
25 0.895 1.046 1.224 0.962 1.073 1.250
30 0.792 1.075 1.326 0.923 1.104 1.383
35 0.701 1.104 1.437 0.886 1.137 1.531
40 0.620 1.135 1.556 0.850 1.170 1.694
45 0.548 1.166 1.686 0.816 1.205 1.875
50 0.485 1.198 1.826 0.783 1.240 2.075
55 0.429 1.231 1.978 0.751 1.277 2.296
60 0.380 1.265 2.142 0.721 1.314 2.541
65 0.336 1.300 2.320 0.692 1.353 2.813
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Table 7: Estimates of sex-related wage diﬀerentials by education levels. Values
obtained as the ratio of remuneration of women and men.
age ISCED0 ISCED2 ISCED3 ISCED5
Italy
25 0.756 0.721 0.810 0.875
30 0.749 0.726 0.814 0.858
35 0.743 0.730 0.818 0.842
40 0.737 0.735 0.822 0.826
45 0.730 0.739 0.826 0.810
50 0.724 0.744 0.829 0.794
55 0.717 0.748 0.832 0.778
60 0.710 0.752 0.835 0.763
65 0.704 0.756 0.838 0.748
Germany
25 0.742 0.691 0.708 0.705
30 0.747 0.641 0.658 0.668
35 0.766 0.606 0.624 0.646
40 0.802 0.585 0.603 0.637
45 0.856 0.576 0.595 0.640
50 0.932 0.578 0.598 0.657
55 1.035 0.591 0.613 0.687
60 1.172 0.617 0.641 0.732
65 1.354 0.657 0.684 0.796
employment levels. Assuming comparable reaction of German and Italian
women to sex-related wage discrimination, it is possible to discard the latter
as a source of lower LFPRs of Italian women.
5.3 Retirement
The aim so far has been to consider possible instruments to raise employ-
ment rates, in particular those of women, analyzing the whole population.
In this section the retirement decision and the relative incentives are stud-
ied, estimating the probability of being retired, of receiving a work-related
pension, of transition between working statuses and of retiring receiving
work-related beneﬁts.
While increasing employment has an immediate eﬀect only on the con-
tributive side of a PAYG pension system, reducing the number of beneﬁcia-
ries acts on both the contributions and the outlays (in the equilibrium ratio
α = PNp/WNw the numerator reduces and the denominator increases).
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5.3.1 Deﬁnition of retirement from work
Quinn and Burkhauser [9] and Leazar [13] give a comprehensive survey of
studies analyzing retirement from work. In this ﬁeld, diﬀerent results ob-
tained from the same data, are due to the diﬀerent deﬁnitions of retirement
adopted. Here, retirement coincides with the ﬁrst work-related pension ben-
eﬁt received.
5.4 Probability of receiving pension beneﬁts
Table 13 presents the coeﬃcients of the linear logit model estimated for the
probability of receiving work-related pension beneﬁts,
ω(x) = Pr(P > 0|X = x). (10)
The constant relates to the reference category whose estimated proba-
bility is:
ω(0) =
eα
1 + eα
, (11)
while
ω(x) =
eα+β
′x
1 + eα+β′x
(12)
is the estimated probability for an individual with characteristics x.
Tables 8 and 9 show the estimated probabilities for the baseline (ISCED2)
and the probabilities for the baseline with diﬀerent education level. Rea-
sonably, the probabilities raise with age. The column “base” shows that
in Italy the probability for men is roughly double that of women and one
third higher than in Germany. The model is able to highlight the institu-
tional diﬀerences between the two countries: up to age 63, the ﬁrst statutory
limit for old-age beneﬁts in Germany, estimates for Italy are higher. In the
ﬁrst years reported in the table, Italian percentages are roughly double than
the German ones. The same is true for women. In this case, though, the
catch-up takes place at age 60, the statutory limit to old-age beneﬁts for
women.
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Table 8: Italy: estimates of the probabilities and the percentage diﬀerentials with
the reference (ISCED2). ISCED0: illiteracy or low education level; ISCED3: high-
school degree; ISCED5: university degree; var.% is the percentage probability dif-
ferential with respect to the reference individual.
age base ISCED0 var.% ISCED3 var.% ISCED5 var.%
Italy - men
50 0.090 0.085 -0.055 0.060 -0.334 0.038 -0.577
51 0.120 0.113 -0.053 0.081 -0.327 0.052 -0.568
52 0.156 0.148 -0.051 0.106 -0.318 0.069 -0.558
53 0.200 0.190 -0.049 0.139 -0.306 0.091 -0.545
54 0.250 0.239 -0.046 0.177 -0.293 0.118 -0.529
55 0.307 0.294 -0.042 0.222 -0.277 0.151 -0.509
56 0.369 0.354 -0.039 0.273 -0.258 0.190 -0.486
57 0.433 0.418 -0.035 0.330 -0.238 0.234 -0.459
58 0.497 0.482 -0.031 0.389 -0.217 0.284 -0.429
59 0.560 0.545 -0.027 0.450 -0.196 0.337 -0.397
60 0.619 0.604 -0.024 0.511 -0.174 0.394 -0.363
61 0.672 0.659 -0.020 0.569 -0.153 0.451 -0.329
62 0.720 0.708 -0.018 0.624 -0.134 0.508 -0.295
63 0.762 0.751 -0.015 0.674 -0.116 0.562 -0.262
64 0.798 0.788 -0.013 0.719 -0.100 0.613 -0.232
65 0.829 0.820 -0.011 0.758 -0.086 0.660 -0.204
Italy - women
50 0.050 0.050 0.012 0.100 1.024 0.138 1.785
51 0.065 0.065 0.012 0.129 0.992 0.175 1.709
52 0.082 0.083 0.012 0.161 0.956 0.216 1.624
53 0.103 0.104 0.011 0.197 0.914 0.261 1.531
54 0.127 0.128 0.011 0.237 0.869 0.308 1.433
55 0.153 0.154 0.011 0.278 0.822 0.356 1.333
56 0.181 0.183 0.010 0.321 0.774 0.404 1.234
57 0.210 0.212 0.010 0.363 0.726 0.450 1.139
58 0.240 0.243 0.010 0.404 0.679 0.493 1.051
59 0.270 0.273 0.009 0.442 0.636 0.532 0.969
60 0.299 0.302 0.009 0.477 0.596 0.567 0.897
61 0.326 0.329 0.009 0.509 0.560 0.598 0.833
62 0.351 0.354 0.008 0.537 0.528 0.624 0.778
63 0.374 0.376 0.008 0.560 0.501 0.647 0.732
64 0.393 0.396 0.008 0.580 0.478 0.665 0.694
65 0.409 0.412 0.007 0.596 0.460 0.680 0.663
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Table 9: Germany: estimates of the probabilities and the percentage diﬀerentials
with the reference (ISCED2). ISCED0: illiteracy or low education level; ISCED3:
high-school degree; ISCED5: university degree; var.% is the percentage probability
diﬀerential with respect to the reference individual.
age base ISCED3 var.% ISCED5 var.%
Germany - men
50 0.058 0.043 -0.259 0.021 -0.634
51 0.072 0.054 -0.256 0.027 -0.630
52 0.091 0.068 -0.253 0.034 -0.626
53 0.115 0.086 -0.248 0.044 -0.619
54 0.147 0.111 -0.241 0.057 -0.611
55 0.188 0.144 -0.232 0.075 -0.599
56 0.240 0.187 -0.220 0.100 -0.583
57 0.305 0.243 -0.205 0.134 -0.561
58 0.383 0.312 -0.187 0.180 -0.531
59 0.472 0.394 -0.164 0.239 -0.493
60 0.566 0.487 -0.139 0.315 -0.444
61 0.659 0.585 -0.112 0.406 -0.385
62 0.745 0.680 -0.087 0.507 -0.319
63 0.818 0.766 -0.064 0.612 -0.251
64 0.875 0.836 -0.044 0.711 -0.187
65 0.917 0.890 -0.030 0.796 -0.132
Germany - women
50 0.012 0.012 0.002 0.016 0.362
51 0.018 0.018 0.002 0.025 0.359
52 0.027 0.027 0.002 0.036 0.355
53 0.039 0.039 0.002 0.053 0.349
54 0.056 0.056 0.002 0.075 0.340
55 0.079 0.079 0.002 0.105 0.329
56 0.109 0.109 0.002 0.144 0.315
57 0.148 0.148 0.002 0.192 0.297
58 0.195 0.196 0.002 0.249 0.276
59 0.252 0.252 0.002 0.315 0.252
60 0.316 0.316 0.002 0.387 0.226
61 0.385 0.385 0.001 0.461 0.198
62 0.456 0.457 0.001 0.534 0.171
63 0.527 0.527 0.001 0.604 0.146
64 0.594 0.595 0.001 0.667 0.123
65 0.655 0.656 0.001 0.722 0.102
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Disregarding as usual ISCED0, higher education levels reduce the prob-
ability of being a recipient of pension beneﬁts for men and raises that of
women. This is due to the wide diﬀerences in employment rates by educa-
tion level within women, especially in Italy. For men, whose employment
rates are high across education levels, there is a positive correlation between
age of retirement and education. In fact, contributive criteria are met earlier
by workers spending less years in formal schooling.
Thus higher education raises the probability of retirement among women
and reduces it among men. In order to analyze the choice of retirement age,
though, modelling the dynamics of retirement is needed.
5.5 Hazard rates estimates
Table 14 reports coeﬃcients of the linear logit model for the probability of
receiving the ﬁrst work related pension beneﬁt,
η(x) = Pr(Pt > 0|Pt−1 = 0, X = x) . (13)
This probability is deﬁned hazard rate:
η(0) =
eα
1 + eα
(14)
η(x) =
eα+β
′x
1 + eα+β′x
. (15)
Equation (14) estimates the probability for the baseline, in this case aged 60
and not 50, whereas (15) is the probability for any other individual. Dummy
variables for age have been used to capture hazard rate spikes.
Estimates of the hazard rates (ﬁgure 5) conﬁrm the results of the non-
parametric analysis of retirement. Concerning education levels, the behavior
of women is clearer than the case for the estimated probabilities of receiv-
ing work-related pension income. With the exception of ISCED2 German
women, hazard rates and education levels are negatively correlated. There
is a strong diﬀerence within Italian women at ISCED0 (around 50% of the
sample) and the others, the latter showing a more uniform behavior. As in
the case of employment rates, younger, more educated cohorts will tend to
retire later.
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Figure 5: Logit probability estimates of receiving a work-related pension by educa-
tion level.
Men will be following the same path, less marked for ISCED1 but ex-
tended to the transition through ISCED2, ISCED3 and ISCED5, which is
associated with a substantial reduction of hazard rates. In Germany, the
only education level that lowers hazard rates is ISCED5 and in the next
5-10 years only the number of graduate women will increase. Therefore, the
scope for gains to the pension system are narrower than in Italy, indepen-
dently from the reforms implemented.
5.6 Pension beneﬁts estimates
The structure of education and sex-related diﬀerentials in pension income
can be interpreted as a scheme of incentives for retirement.
Table 15 presents the coeﬃcients and the standard errors of the esti-
mates on the log of pension beneﬁts. Here, education levels have not been
interacted with age, so that dichotomous variables measure the log of the
pension beneﬁts diﬀerential with respect to ISCED2. The number of months
of pension beneﬁts received has been included. The remaining regressors are
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Table 10: Estimates of pension beneﬁt diﬀerentials by sex and education levels.
Ratios of beneﬁts for women against those of men.
age ISCED0 ISCED2 ISCED3 ISCED5
Italy
50 0.520 0.591 0.665 0.688
55 0.508 0.576 0.649 0.671
60 0.511 0.580 0.653 0.675
65 0.530 0.601 0.677 0.700
70 0.566 0.643 0.724 0.749
Germany
50 0.537 0.456 0.614 1.063
55 0.442 0.375 0.505 0.874
60 0.364 0.308 0.416 0.719
65 0.300 0.254 0.342 0.593
70 0.247 0.210 0.283 0.489
comparable to those of the labor earnings models. Since for i close to zero
ei  1+ i, it is possible to compare the logs of education-related diﬀerential
with those obtained for wages (table 6).
At ISCED0 and ISCED3 diﬀerentials are comparable to those obtained
for earnings at ages between 50 and 60. At ISCED5 diﬀerential are lower:
graduated Italian men receive pension earnings that is 52.7% higher (= e0.42)
while the income diﬀerential is equal to 92%. The loss of purchasing power
(in absolute terms) and the delay in reaching contributive requirements help
explaining delayed retirement. The same seems to hold for Germany and
particularly for women, whose diﬀerentials are the highest.
Table 10 presents sex-related diﬀerentials wider than is the case of labor
income (table 7). The highest diﬀerentials are in Germany and they are
increasing with age, while they are roughly constant in Italy and narrower
at higher education levels.
Diﬀerentials, wider for pension beneﬁts than for wages, are thus partly
inherited from work history and partly due to pension formulas. Working
mothers, who are subject to prolonged interruptions of their work history,
seem to be more penalized in Germany. In Italy, use of the last wages in
pension computation guarantees higher beneﬁts to working mothers.
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6 Conclusions
This work has concentrated on a comparison of wage, pension income, labor
force participation rates (LFPRs) and retirement behavior in Germany and
Italy. Aging populations and the ﬁnancial strain originating thereof, pose
the issue of sustainability of PAYG pension systems. This analysis helps
to shed some light on the eﬀects of institutional arrangements in shaping
workers behavior regarding LFPRs and retirement. These results can also
help assessing the scope of recent and foreseeable reforms in aﬀecting the
ﬁnancial sustainability of pension systems in Italy and Germany.
The underlying matter is whether a PAYG pension system will be ﬁnan-
cially sustainable and if the reforms implemented or planned in recent years
move pension schemes towards the equilibrium.
The main tool used in this study has been the comparison allowed by
two longitudinal surveys, SHIW for Italy and GSOEP for Germany.
The two countries, other than for mentality, traditions and history, are
suﬃciently similar for many demographic, social and economic aspects. For
this reason, it is possible to isolate diﬀerences coming out from the data1,
also institutional diﬀerences, that determine in Italy lower LFPRs by women
and elderly.
The main obstacle Italy is overcoming is the gap in average education
levels. As a result, independently from labor market or pension system
reforms, there should be an increase of LFPRs of women and of the average
retirement age.
For women in particular, lower LFPRs are normally addressed as an
eﬀect of wage diﬀerentials with respect to men. The analysis shows that
this is not the case: Germany shows higher diﬀerentials as well as higher
LFPRs.
Education-related diﬀerentials are able to explain most of the diﬀerences
between Italy and Germany in employment rates. But they are not able to
1An unobservable factor could be a diﬀerent attitude in supplementing one’s income
“oﬀ the books” after being retired from work.
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explain the lower retirement age in Italy, if compared to that in Germany.
The data indicate as the main source of these discrepancies the incentives
provided by the old Italian pension system. In particular, the absence of
an age limit for long-service pensions is fully exploited by Italian workers:
almost 80% of men retire before 60, the limit for old-age retirement before
the 1992 reform.
The results drawn form the analysis refer to a sample of workers retired
between 1990 and 1995, during the transition period of the reforms of 1992
in both countries and before the 1995 “Dini” reform in Italy. Changes
happened between 1993 and 1995 have still an eﬀect too limited to be caught
by the data.
Nevertheless, the Italian reforms seem to be moving in the right direction
conditioning early retirement on an age limit and raising female normal
retirement age.
Given that Italian workers currently near retirement age present low ed-
ucation levels, and therefore a higher estimated probability to retire, the
reforms would have on them the strongest impact. Without addressing the
problem of vested rights and therefore the need of the gradual implementa-
tion of the reforms, these ﬁndings could be useful to the policy maker.
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A Appendix
Table 11: Coeﬃcients, standard errors and signiﬁcance level of the logit model:
Probability to receive a labor related income (* indicates a signiﬁcance level less
than 10% and ** less than 5%). n are the number of observations and R2 measures
the statistic adaptation (like the linear R2).
Italy Germany
men women men women
age -0.1854 -0.1342 -0.1093 -0.1158
(0.0079)** (0.0076)** (0.0039)** (0.0032)**
age2 -0.0073 -0.0056 -0.0040 -0.0037
(0.0004)** (0.0003)** (0.0002)** (0.0002)**
year -0.0800 0.0187 0.0004 0.0387
(0.0150)** (0.0108)* (0.0042) (0.0031)**
ISCED0 -0.3730 -0.4051
(0.0844)** (0.0756)**
ISCED3 0.3681 1.1861 0.2882 0.1855
(0.1029)** (0.0859)** (0.0508)** (0.0427)**
ISCED5 1.2656 2.4757 0.3762 0.8850
(0.1964)** (0.1597)** (0.0660)** (0.0778)**
ISCED0∗age 0.0256 0.0275
(0.0083)** (0.0074)**
ISCED3∗age 0.0458 0.0264 0.0462 0.0116
(0.0065)** (0.0059)** (0.0034)** (0.0030)**
ISCED5∗age 0.1043 0.0800 0.0373 0.0428
(0.0112)** (0.0104)** (0.0046)** (0.0054)**
not married -1.4667 0.4274 -0.5871 0.4428
(0.0943)** (0.0607)** (0.0448)** (0.0339)**
no children -0.3559 0.1177 -0.1585 0.7874
(0.0831)** (0.0572)** (0.0498)** (0.0357)**
# components -0.1243 -0.2660 -0.0649 -0.2773
(0.0245)** (0.0208)** (0.0181)** (0.0146)**
home owner 0.0812 0.2621 0.1584 -0.0182
(0.0646) (0.0479)** (0.0366)** (0.0268)
base 2.2379 -0.8373 1.8074 -0.5342
(0.1064)** (0.0854)** (0.0520)** (0.0404)**
n 10393 11049 29499 29624
R2 0.21 0.16 0.06 0.09
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Table 12: Coeﬃcients, standard errors and signiﬁcance level of the log-linear model
for yearly net wages (* indicates a signiﬁcance level less than 10% and ** less than
5%). n are the number of observations and R2 measures the statistic adaptation
Italy Germany
men women men women
age 0.0046 0.0057 -0.0108 -0.0081
(0.0012)** (0.0024)** (0.0008)** (0.0012)**
age2 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0003
(0.0001)** (0.0001)** (0.0000)** (0.0001)**
not married -0.1481 -0.0121 -0.1656 0.1425
(0.0128)** (0.0225) (0.0079)** (0.0119)**
partner employed -0.0121 0.0251 -0.0291 0.0143
(0.0094) (0.0212) (0.0064)** (0.0121)
hours worked 0.0091 0.0158 0.0096 0.0337
(0.0006)** (0.0007)** (0.0004)** (0.0004)**
months worked 0.1584 0.1583 0.1853 0.1753
(0.0023)** (0.0026)** (0.0025)** (0.0026)**
ISCED0 -0.1559 -0.1831 -0.7233 -0.2447
(0.0143)** (0.0285)** (0.1483)** (0.1471)*
ISCED3 0.2155 0.3241 0.1807 0.2152
(0.0144)** (0.0264)** (0.0103)** (0.0174)**
ISCED5 0.4916 0.5571 0.6020 0.7299
(0.0195)** (0.0331)** (0.0124)** (0.0258)**
age∗ISCED0 -0.0051 -0.0081 -0.0245 -0.0082
(0.0014)** (0.0029)** (0.0071)** (0.0076)
age∗ISCED3 0.0047 0.0044 0.0054 0.0058
(0.0011)** (0.0018)** (0.0007)** (0.0012)**
age∗ISCED5 0.0107 0.0056 0.0160 0.0203
(0.0016)** (0.0025)** (0.0009)** (0.0018)**
year -0.0057 -0.0138 0.0117 0.0130
(0.0025)** (0.0038)** (0.0008)** (0.0012)**
base 3.3691 3.0731 3.7821 3.2334
(0.0120)** (0.0273)** (0.0090)** (0.0157)**
n 5537 3352 21812 13476
R2 0.60 0.66 0.37 0.55
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Table 13: Coeﬃcients, standard errors of the logit model: probability of receiving a
labor-related pension (* signiﬁcance level less than 10% and ** signiﬁcance level less
than 5%). n indicates the number of observations, R2 indicates a pseudo r-squared.
Italy Germany
men women men women
age 0.3195 0.2857 0.2230 0.4156
(0.0170)** (0.0139)** (0.0154)** (0.0171)**
age2 -0.0040 -0.0076 0.0082 -0.0053
(0.0008)** (0.0005)** (0.0009)** (0.0007)**
year 0.0775 0.0159 0.0044 -0.0123
(0.0165)** (0.0146) (0.0065) (0.0060)**
ISCED0 -0.0618 0.0126 3.0928 1.5376
(0.0821) (0.0831) (0.5104)** (0.3451)**
ISCED3 -0.4396 0.7603 -0.3161 0.0023
(0.1025)** (0.1082)** (0.0609)** (0.0615)
ISCED5 -0.9149 1.1220 -1.0428 0.3134
(0.1499)** (0.1690)** (0.0902)** (0.1138)**
not married -0.1815 0.0139 -0.1092 -0.0500
(0.1181) (0.0681) (0.0832) (0.0578)
no children 0.1321 -0.2771 -0.3437 -0.2086
(0.1030) (0.1213)** (0.1049)** (0.1411)
#components -0.1503 -0.1977 -0.1872 -0.2059
(0.0315)** (0.0300)** (0.0353)** (0.0351)**
home owner 0.0779 0.4078 -0.2680 -0.2479
(0.0762) (0.0666)** (0.0553)** (0.0477)**
base -2.3107 -2.9523 -2.7837 -4.4014
(0.1391)** (0.1565)** (0.1117)** (0.1630)**
n 7141 7803 15760 17753
R2 0.40 0.18 0.51 0.43
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Table 14: Coeﬃcients, standard errors of the logit model: probability of receiving
the ﬁrst labor-related pension (* signiﬁcance level under 10% and ** signiﬁcance
level under 5%). n indicates the number of observations, R2 indicates a pseudo
r-squared.
Italy Germany
men women men women
year 0.2464 0.2077 0.0676 0.0832
(0.0300)** (0.0486)** (0.0124)** (0.0154)**
ISCED0 0.3219 0.7505 0.8485 2.3150
(0.1383)** (0.2527)** (1.7965) (1.2097)*
ISCED3 -0.3490 -0.2314 -0.0352 0.2578
(0.1705)** (0.2877) (0.1154) (0.1656)
ISCED5 -1.0494 -0.5145 -0.7365 -0.8137
(0.2808)** (0.4244) (0.1689)** (0.2752)**
no child 0.5626 0.3578 -0.4740 -0.5592
(0.1832)** (0.4123) (0.2173)** (0.3496)
#components -0.1365 -0.1080 -0.2144 -0.0948
(0.0499)** (0.0831) (0.0627)** (0.0794)
home owner 0.0599 0.7734 -0.1086 -0.0990
(0.1289) (0.2190)** (0.1076) (0.1321)
base 0.0420 -0.2876 -0.0039 1.2381
(0.2816) (0.5625) (0.2494) (0.3686)**
χ2(13) 176** 107** 666** 666**
n 2298 827 5644 3225
R2 0.15 0.21 0.26 0.40
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Table 15: Coeﬃcients, standard errors and signiﬁcance level of the log-linear model
for yearly net labor-related pensions (* indicates a signiﬁcance level less than 10%
and ** less than 5%). n are the number of observations and R2 measures the
statistic adaptation.
Italy Germany
men women men women
age -0.0113 -0.0193 0.0333 -0.0061
(0.0043)** (0.0045)** (0.0037)** (0.0078)
age2 -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0010
(0.0002) (0.0002)** (0.0001)** (0.0003)**
not married -0.0908 0.0252 -0.0592 0.3005
(0.0240)** (0.0190) (0.0181)** (0.0226)**
employed partner -0.3747 -0.2629 -0.3882 -0.0526
(0.0489)** (0.0639)** (0.0496)** (0.1295)
months 0.1397 0.1219 0.1391 0.1656
(0.0057)** (0.0071)** (0.0040)** (0.0069)**
ISCED0 -0.3140 -0.1874 -0.0920 -0.2568
(0.0187)** (0.0268)** (0.0737) (0.1443)*
ISCED3 0.2005 0.4460 0.1783 0.3121
(0.0251)** (0.0328)** (0.0151)** (0.0295)**
ISCED5 0.4238 0.7032 0.4747 1.1570
(0.0385)** (0.0471)** (0.0235)** (0.0540)**
year 0.0107 -0.0101 0.0075 0.0261
(0.0038)** (0.0045)** (0.0018)** (0.0032)**
base 3.1315 2.4785 3.1038 2.4828
(0.0310)** (0.0373)** (0.0276)** (0.0629)**
n 3102 2117 5099 5161
R2 0.36 0.41 0.30 0.22
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